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In the ultimatum-game, as in many real-life social exchange situations, the selfish motive
to maximize own gains conflicts with fairness preferences. In the present study we
manipulated the availability of cognitive-control resources for ultimatum-game proposers
to test whether preference for fairness is a deliberative cognitive-controlled act or an
automatic act. In two experiments we found that a shortage of cognitive control (ego
depletion) led proposers in the ultimatum game (UG) to propose significantly more equal
split offers than non-depleted proposers. These results can be interpreted as resulting
from an automatic concern for fairness, or from a greater fear of rejection, which would be
in line with a purely self-interested response. To separate these competing explanations,
in Experiment 2 we conducted a dictator-game in which the responder cannot reject
the offer. In contrast to the increased fairness behavior demonstrated by depleted
ultimatum-game proposers, we found that depleted dictator-game allocators chose the
equal split significantly less often than non-depleted allocators. These results indicate that
fairness preferences are automatically driven among UG proposers. The automatic fair
behavior, however, at least partially reflects concern about self-interest gain. We discuss
different explanations for these results.
Keywords: social preferences, fairness, ultimatum game, dictator game, dual process, cognitive-control, self-
control, ego-depletion
INTRODUCTION
Behavioral decision-making research suggests that behavior is
best understood as resulting from the operation of at least
two underlying systems: the affective (system 1) and the delib-
erative (system 2). The affective system is generally described
as fast, automatic, associative in nature, emotionally charged,
and requires minimal cognitive resources. In contrast, the
deliberative system is slow, deliberately controlled, analytical,
affect free, and requires cognitive resources (e.g., Stanovich, 1999;
Kahneman and Frederick, 2002, pp. 49–81; and for an overview:
Evans, 2008). For individual decision-making tasks, such as
inter-temporal choice, agreement exists among researchers about
the behavior expected under the affective system, but for social
decision-making the evidence is equivocal (e.g., Loewenstein
et al., 2008). It is not clear whether economic self-interest or
social preferences, such as fairness, are the primary motives (i.e.,
automatic) that need to be controlled by the deliberative system.
In the current study, we contribute to this ongoing discussion
by studying the role of cognitive-control in fairness behavior.
Specifically, we examine whether fairness behavior is a deliberate
act that requires self-control or whether it is evoked automatically.
Answering this question is important because people often make
social decisions under conditions of limited cognitive-control
resources, such as exhaustion, sleep deprivation, cognitive load,
and time pressure.
A well-known paradigm customarily used to study fair-
ness perception and behavior is the Ultimatum Game (UG;
Guth et al., 1982). In this game, two players are given an
opportunity to split a sum of money. One player proposes how
to split the sum, and another player responds. If the responder
accepts the offer, the money is split as proposed. If the responder
rejects the offer, neither player receives anything. The standard
economicmodel dictates that the proposer should offer the small-
est possible amount of money since the responder would accept
any offer above zero. Contrary to this prediction, empirical results
show that individuals consider fairness in their offers and choices.
Proposers, on average, ask for less than 70% of the total sum, and
responders usually reject unfair offers (for an overview: Camerer,
2003).
Models of social preferences address this fairness behavior.
According to inequality aversion theories, people may not only
care about their absolute outcome but also about their relative
share (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).
As a result, people may prefer to decrease the difference between
their outcome and the outcome for others, even if this diminishes
their absolute outcome. Alternatively, according to reciprocal fair-
ness based theory, people care about the intention behind the
offer and are willing to pay to punish (or reward) their oppo-
nents for their unfair (fair) offers (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Blount, 1995;
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Bereby-Meyer and Niederle,
2005; Radke et al., 2012).
It has been suggested that fairness preferences result from
deliberation processes (Moore and Loewenstein, 2004; see Knoch
et al., 2006, for neurological support among UG responders).
According to this view, egoism-based self-interest is the primary
motive that needs to be constrained. In line with this suggestion,
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developmental studies have found that kindergarteners behave
according to the standard economic model (e.g., Bereby-Meyer
and Fiks, in press), while fairness preferences are most likely
learned throughout life (Gürog˘lu et al., 2009, 2011; Bereby-Meyer
and Fiks, in press). However, the majority of neurological (e.g.,
Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008) and behavioral (e.g.,
Cappelletti et al., 2011; Halali et al., in press) findings regard-
ing UG responders suggest that by adulthood reciprocal fairness
preferences become automatic relative to self-interest considera-
tions. Thus, they are those that need to be controlled. Accordingly,
Halali et al. (in press), found that a shortage of cognitive-control
resources resulted in an increase in rejection rates of unfair offers
in the UG, i.e., an increase in reciprocity behavior.
CURRENT RESEARCH
In the current study, we examine the effect of cognitive con-
trol shortage on fairness behavior of UG proposers. By cognitive
control (also termed “self-control” or “executive-control”; e.g.,
Schmeichel, 2007; Robinson et al., 2010) we mean the abil-
ity to “deliberately inhibit dominant, automatic, or prepotent
responses,” in order to maximize the long-term best interests of
the individual (e.g., Mischel, 1996; pp. 197–218; Muraven and
Baumeister, 2000). According to the deliberative approach to
fairness preferences (e.g., Moore and Loewenstein, 2004) self-
interested behavior will increase under a shortage of cognitive
control, i.e., an increased rate of unfair UG offers is expected.
Contrary to that prediction, based on the automatic tendency
of reciprocal fairness observed in the UG responders’ behavior
(Halali et al., in press), we expect an increase in fairness behav-
ior under a shortage of cognitive control. Initial support for
this hypothesis can be found in Rubinstein (2007) who found
that equal split offers compared to non-equal offers are imple-
mented faster, and by Cappelletti et al. (2011) who found that UG
proposers offer more under time pressure.
To reveal the automatic tendency of UG proposers, in the
current study, following Halali et al. (in press), we adopted the
strength model suggested by Baumeister et al. (1998). According
to this theory, self-control relies on a limited resource that gets
depleted when one tries to inhibit competing behaviors, urges,
or desires, just as a muscle tires after performing an effortful
action. Consequently, an initial act of self-control impairs sub-
sequent acts of self-control, even in unrelated tasks; this state
is called ego-depletion (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al.,
1998; Vohs and Heatherton, 2000; for a review, see Baumeister
et al., 2007). The limited resource explanation has been disputed
recently (e.g., Inzlicht and Schmeichel, 2012), however, there is
agreement regarding the ego-depletion phenomenon, given the
numerous experiments that support this finding (for a meta-
analysis: Hagger et al., 2010). Thus, given that deliberate actions
require cognitive-control resources, a state of depletion should
increase automatic behavior (e.g., Vohs, 2006; Masicampo and
Baumeister, 2008). In two experiments, we had our participants
undergo an ego depletion manipulation and then examined the
(un)fairness of their offers in the role of proposers in the UG.
Given our assumption that fairness preferences are automatic, we
expected an increased rate of fair offers by depleted participants
compared to non-depleted participants.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Participants
Twenty nine participants (14 Female and 15 Male) with no pre-
vious knowledge of the UG, participated in exchange to 20 New
Israeli Shekels (NIS; approximately $5).We informed participants
ahead of time that we will randomly choose five participants
and pay them according to their actual earnings in one random
trial of the UG, which we actually did. We randomly assigned
participants to one of two experimental conditions: depletion
(n = 14; 7 Females, 7 Males), no-depletion (n = 15; 7 Females,
8 Males).
MATERIALS
Depletion task
We manipulated the cognitive-control resources depletion using
Mead et al.’s (2009) procedure, which has been also used by Halali
et al. (in press). Participants in the depletion condition completed
20 incongruent trials of the Stroop (1935) task. In each trial, par-
ticipants had to name the color of the ink and suppress their
automatic tendency to read the incongruent color word. In the
no-depletion condition, the words matched the ink colors, making
it unnecessary to ignore the words. Therefore, the incongruent
condition required more cognitive-control resources than did the
congruent condition.
UG task
We randomly assigned participants to the role of proposers
in a computerized version of a mini UG. We first thoroughly
instructed participants about the nature of the rules of the UG.
The task included 8 different independent trials with 8 differ-
ent responders, who play the game in a different session of
the same experiment. Other than that, we did not give the
participants any other information regarding the responders.
In each round, proposers had to make a one-time monetary
offer of either a fair division, i.e., 50% of the stake for both
players, or an unfair division, i.e., 80% of the stake to the
proposer and 20% to the responder. Four different “Rejection-
Outcomes” were associated with the different offers. As can be
seen in Figure 1, these outcomes were: 0, 10, 20, or 30% of
the stake to each player. For each Rejection-Outcome we imple-
mented two different “Stake-Size”: 100 NIS and 200 NIS (∼25
and $50, respectively). We presented the 8 trials (4 Rejection
Outcome ×2 Stake-Size) in a random order. We randomized
the location of the equal split (50:50) on the screen (i.e.,
left/right) and its response-key within participants. To avoid out-
come effects we did not give participants feedback about the
responders’ choices during the experiment. Note that the higher
the Rejection-Outcome is, the lower are the consequences of a
rejection for proposers’ payoff. This tendency, however, is the
same for the responders, which causes the risk of rejection to
increase. Consequently, we do not expect the Rejection-Outcome
to affect proposers’ offers or to interact with the experimental
condition. Thus, we were able to improve the statistical power
of our test by presenting participants with several repetitions
of the UG while minimizing the risk that participants will be
bored.
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FIGURE 1 | Experiment 1’s UG task with four different
Rejection-Outcome.
Mood and arousal
Participants completed the Brief Mood Introspection Scale
(BMIS; Mayer and Gaschke, 1988) that measures mood and
arousal. The BMIS assesses participants’ current mood based on
their responses to 16 adjectives. In particular, participants rate
how they feel in relation to each of the adjectives on a five-point
Likert scale (1 = definitely do not feel, 5 = definitely do feel). The
scale contains two subscales; mood valance and arousal.
PROCEDURE
We invited participants to different timeslots in groups of up to
six participants each. With arrival participants were seated in a
separate computer desks. All the assignments and questionnaires
were computerized. After signing the consent form, and before
starting the depletion task, we verbally informed participants that
they would participate in a number of separate and independent
experiments. Following the Depletion task, participants reported
their mood and arousal levels on the BMIS, and following the
UG task, they answered a questionnaire aimed at assessing sus-
picion regarding their partners in the UG. Participants had to
indicate regarding the identity of the responders whether they are:
“participants (a) from different sessions; (b) in the same lab with
them; (c) different: ______.”
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Two participants were excluded from the analysis since they indi-
cated they did not believe they are playing a real game with real
responders. The pattern of the following reported results was the
same when these participants were included in the analysis.
We submitted the participants’ offers (0: unequal, 1: equal split
offers) to a three-way generalized probit estimation equations
for binominal data with Condition (depletion, no-depletion) as
a between-participant independent variable, Rejection-Outcome
(0, 10, 20, 30%) and Stake-Size (100, 200 NIS) as within-
participant independent variables, and the participants as a ran-
dom factor.
We found a significant main effect for Condition: Wald
χ2(1) = 4.12, p = 0.042. As expected, on average, compared
with the no-depletion condition (M = 52.7%), depletion state
resulted in significantly higher rate of equal split offers (M =
68.3%). In addition, a two way interaction between Rejection-
Outcome and Stake-Size was found, (Wald χ2(3) = 9.39, p =
0.025). Since we did not have a clear prediction regarding this
interaction and it was not relevant to the significant main effect
of Condition which is the focus of this experiment, we did not fur-
ther analyze this interaction. No other effect or interactions were
significant (all ps > 0.05).
The experimental condition did not affect Mood (no-
depletion: M = 15.0, SD = 6.9, depletion: M = 12.1, SD = 6.9;
F < 1.2, n.s.) or Arousal (no-depletion: M = 16.4, SD = 4.7,
depletion: M = 17.4, SD = 6.0; F < 1, n.s.), thus, they are
unlikely to account for the reported effect.
To summarize, the results of Experiment 1 showed that a
shortage of cognitive-control resources led to an increase in the
tendency to propose fair offers in the UG. This increase in fair
offers proposals is in line with the tendency of UG proposers to
propose more fair offers under time pressure (Cappelletti et al.,
2011). In principle, the observed high proportion of fair offers
may either be due to an automatic fear of rejection (selfish com-
ponent) or to automatic fairness preferences. In Experiment 2, we
tried to decide between these two motives.
EXPERIMENT 2
To further disentangle the two aforementioned explanations for
the automatic tendency to propose fair offers in the UG, in
Experiment 2 we use the dictator game (DG; Forsythe et al.,
1994), a variant of the UG in which the responder cannot reject
the offer. The advantage of the DG is that there is no fear of rejec-
tion in this game. At the same time, however, the DG removes the
reciprocal relationship inherent in the UG—an observation that
we get back to in the concluding section. If fairness preferences
are automatic then we expect in the UG as well as in the DG to
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an increase in the rate of fair offers under a shortage in cognitive
control. However, if selfish considerations associated with the per-
ceived risk drive the automatic tendency to propose higher offers,
then, we don’t expect an increase in fair offers in the DG under a
shortage in cognitive control. If something, we may even expect a
decrease in the rate of fair offers in the DG. This prediction will
be in line with the reduction in helping behavior observed among
depleted participants (DeWall et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2012), and
with a recent response-time study onDG allocators (Piovesan and
Wengström, 2009) which found that self interested choices are
made quicker than fair choices, both in a between and a within
participants analysis.
Finally, one of the major dispositional factors related to
decision-making in social situations is social value orientation
(SVO; Van Lange et al., 1997). SVO are individual differences
in how people evaluate outcomes for themselves and others
(Messick and McClintock, 1968; Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975).
Van Lange (1999) suggested that most people can be classified
as being pro-socials, competitors, or individualists. Because indi-
vidualists and competitors—both assign a higher weight to their
own outcomes than to the outcomes of others they are usu-
ally taken together and defined as pro-self (e.g., Van Lange and
Kuhlman, 1994). Regarding fairness preferences, Van Dijk et al.
(2004) found that only pro-self participants are sensitive to the
strategic aspect of the UG game. For example, in one of their
experiments, when responders received incomplete information,
pro-self participants took advantage of that and kept for them-
selves more money, while leading the responders to believe that
they got a fair proposal. Yet, Van Dijk et al. (2004), have not
examined the effect of SVO on automatic fairness behavior. In
Experiment 2, therefore, we also assessed participants’ SVO using
the decomposed games measure suggested by Van Lange et al.
(1997).
METHOD
Participants
One hundred and seventeen undergraduate students (59 Female
and 58 Male) with no previous knowledge on the UG or the
DG, participated in exchange to extra course credit. We randomly
assigned participants to one of four experimental conditions: UG
depletion (n = 24; 11 Females, 13 Males), UG no-depletion (n =
25; 14 Females, 11 Males), DG depletion (n = 37; 18 Females,
19 Males), DG no-depletion (n = 31; 16 Females, 15 Males). We
informed participants ahead of time that we will randomly choose
8 participants and pay them according to their actual earnings in
one random trial of the UG/DG, which we actually did.
MATERIALS
Depletion task
We manipulated cognitive-control resources depletion using the
Schmeichel’s (2007) procedure. We instructed participants in the
no-depletion condition to “Write a story about a recent trip you
have taken. It may be a trip to a store, to some location in
Israel, or to another country—wherever! Please keep writing until
the computer program asks you to stop.” For participants in
the depletion condition we gave an additional instruction: “Very
important! Please do not use the letters “Aleph” (equivalent to
the English letter a) or “Nun” (equivalent to the English let-
ter n) anywhere in your story.” Hence, one group was required
to regulate their writing by avoiding the use of two common
letters, whereas the other group did not get any writing restric-
tions. The experimenter stopped all participants after 5min of
writing.
UG/DG task
First we thoroughly instructed participants about the rules of the
game they were assigned to. In the UG participants played in the
role of proposers, offering one-time monetary offers to 4 differ-
ent responders. Each offer involved different stake size: 100, 80,
50, and 20 NIS (∼25, 20, 12.5 and $5, respectively), presented
in a randomized order. We used a computerized version of the
UG, in which the responders are participants from another aca-
demic institution who play the game in a different session of
the same experiment. Other than that, we did not give the par-
ticipants any other information regarding the responders. On
each trial, participants first saw the stake amount for that trial,
and then a response scale indicating the proportion of the stake
size that they want to offer to their partner, from 0 to 50%, in
increments of 10. In the DG, the task was the same as in the
UG except for the fact that the responder has no decision to
make.
Assessment of social value orientation
As the last task, following an unrelated filler task, participants
completed a nine-item Decomposed Games Measure (Van Lange
et al., 1997). They chose among combinations of outcomes for
themselves and for an anonymous other. These choices are made
in a non-strategic setting (i.e., the outcomes depend only on
what the participant chooses). Outcomes are represented by
points, and participants are instructed to imagine that the points
have value to themselves and to the other person. Each option
represents a particular orientation. An example is the choice
between alternative A: 500 points for self and 100 points for
other, B: 500 points for self and 500 for other, and C: 550 points
for self and 300 for other. Option A represents the competitive
orientation because this distribution maximizes the difference
between one’s own outcomes and the other’s outcomes (Choice A:
500–100 = 400, vs. B: 500–500 = 0, and C: 550–300 = 250).
Option B represents the cooperative or pro-social orientation,
because it provides an equal distribution of outcomes (i.e., 500
for self and other), and generates the highest number of collective
outcomes (i.e., 1000). Finally, option C represents the individual-
istic option because one’s own outcomes are maximized (550 vs.
choice A: 500, and B: 500) irrespective of the other’s outcomes.
Participants are classified as pro-social, individualistic or compet-
itive when at least six choices (out of nine) are consistent with one
of the three orientations (e.g., Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994). As
in some prior research on SVO, we combined the individualists
and competitors to form a group of pro-self individuals (e.g., Van
Dijk et al., 2004).
Mood and arousal
Wemeasured mood and arousal using the BMIS, in the same way
as in Experiment 1.
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PROCEDURE
We invited participants to different timeslots in groups of up to
6 participants each. Each participant sat in a separate computer
desks. All the assignments and questionnaires were computerized.
Following the UG/DG task, participants answered a questionnaire
that assesses suspicion regarding their partners in the UG/DG.
They indicated regarding the identity of the proposers whether
they are: “participants (a) from other academic institutes; (b)
from future sessions in the same institute; (c) in the same lab with
them; (d) different: ______.” Next, as a manipulation check, par-
ticipants rated the difficulty of the writing task, on a scale from 1
(not at all difficult) to 7 (very difficult), and reported their mood
and arousal levels on the BMIS.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A total of 23 participants were excluded from all analyses. Fifteen
participants were excluded because of their performance in the
depletion regulated-writing task: 13 participants (5 in the UG, 8
in the DG) used the forbidden letters in over 10% of the words
they wrote, and 2 participants (1 in the UG, 1 in the DG) did not
write anything at all. Eight participants (3 in the UG and 5 in the
DG) were excluded since they indicated they did not believe they
were playing a real game with real responders. The pattern of the
following reported results was the same when these participants
were included in the analyses.
Manipulation check
Ratings of the difficulty of the initial writing task indicate that the
instructions in the depletion condition indeed were more difficult
to follow (M = 4.14, SD = 1.84) than the free writing instructions
in the no-depletion condition (M = 2.42, SD = 1.49), F(1, 92) =
25.04, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.21. This pattern is consistent with the
assumption that the two writing instructions required different
degrees of cognitive-control.
Decision-making
No main effects for Gender or for Stake-Size or any interactions
with these factors were found in any of the analyses (all ps> 0.05)
and thus these factors were not further analyzed.
We calculated for each participant the proportion of equal split
offers (i.e., 50% of the stake). We submitted the proportion of
equal split offers to a Two-Way ANOVA with Game (UG, DG)
and Condition (depletion, no-depletion) as between-participant
independent variables1. Consistent with previous results regard-
ing the UG and the DG, we found a marginally significant
main effect for the Game: F(1, 90) = 3.78, p = 0.055, η2p = 0.04,
indicating that the proportion of equal split offers was higher
for UG participants (M = 70.0%, SD = 40.9) compared to DG
participants (M = 55.1%, SD = 45.9). While the main effect
of Condition was not significant (F < 1, n.s.), the Game ×
Condition interaction was highly significant, F(1, 90) = 12.25,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.12 (see Figure 2).
To probe the significant interaction, we conducted two sim-
ple contrast analyses, one for the UG and one for the DG. In each
1A Probit regression with subjects as a random variable, participants’ offers
as the dependent variable and Condition, Game and the interaction between
them as independent variables, revealed the same results.
FIGURE 2 | Means and standard errors of the proportion of equal split
offers in Experiment 2 as a function of Game and Condition.
contrast we compared the average proportions of equal split offers
in the depletion and in the no-depletion groups. Consistent with
Experiment 1’s results, depleted UG participants proposed signif-
icantly higher rate of equal split offers (M = 85.3%, SD = 30.7)
compared to the non-depleted participants (M = 58.7%, SD =
44.3), F(1, 90) = 4.04, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.04. The pattern of results
was reversed for the DG participants, i.e., depletion state resulted
in significantly lower rate of equal split offers (M = 37.9%, SD =
45.1) compared to the no-depletion state (M = 72.2%, SD =
40.6), F(1, 90) = 9.25, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.09.
The experimental condition, as in Experiment 1, did not affect
Arousal asmeasured by the BMIS (no-depletion:M = 20.0, SD =
5.6, depletion: M = 19.4, SD = 5.7; F < 1, n.s.). Thus, Arousal is
unlikely to account for the reported effects. However, for Mood
valence (i.e., pleasant vs. unpleasant), we found a main effect
of Condition, F(1,90) = 4.75, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.05. Different than
expected participants who performed the writing task in the
depletion condition reported being in a more pleasant mood
(M = 10.57, SD = 9.61) than participants who performed the
free-writing task in the no-depletion condition (M = 6.24, SD =
9.44), with no main effect for Game nor an interaction between
Game and Condition (both Fs< 1, n.s.). To rule out the possibil-
ity that the mood accounts for the differences in the proposals we
repeated the analysis on the proportion of equal split offers, while
including as covariates Mood valence and Arousal. Neither Mood
(F < 1, n.s.), nor Arousal (F < 1.25, n.s.), reliably predict the pro-
portion of equal split offers, whereas the marginally significant
main effect for Game [F(1, 88) = 3.47, p = 0.066, η2p = 0.04],
and the significant Game × Condition interaction [F(1, 88) =
10.69, p < 0.002, η2p = 0.11] obtained in the original analysis
were hardly affected. Hence, although there were unexpected
differences in self-reported Mood valence between the two exper-
imental conditions, these differences did not account for the
pattern of results in the UG and the DG tasks.
Social value orientation
In the present experiment, out of 94 participants included in
the previous analysis, nine participants (4 in the UG, 5 in the
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DG) made fewer than six consistent choices according to one of
the three orientations (e.g., Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994) in
the nine-item Decomposed Games Measure. Hence, they could
not be classified and were therefore excluded from further analy-
ses. Of the 85 remaining participants, 51 (60.0%) were classified
as pro-social and 34 (40.0%) as pro-self. The distribution of
pro-socials and pro-selfs in each experimental condition was as
follows: UG depletion (n = 15: 10 pro-socials, 5 pro-selfs), UG
no-depletion (n = 21: 11 pro-socials, 10 pro-selfs), DG depletion
(n = 27: 16 pro-socials, 11 pro-selfs), DG no-depletion (n = 22:
14 pro-socials, 8 pro-selfs). There were no significant differences
in the proportion of pro-socials in each of the four experimental
conditions (all χ2 < 1, n.s.).
We repeated the analysis for the proportion of equal split
offers with participants’ SVO (pro-self, pro-social) as an addi-
tional between-participant independent variable. The Game ×
Condition interaction remained significant, F(1, 77) = 10.07, p <
0.003, η2p = 0.12, with the same pattern as previously reported.
We also obtained a significant main effect for SVO, F(1, 77) =
6.21, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.07, indicating that, across Game and
Condition, pro-social participants had a higher rate of equal
split offers (M = 70.0%, SD = 40.3) compared to pro-self partic-
ipants (M = 43.4%, SD = 47.8). No other effect was significant
(all ps > 0.10). Therefore, SVO did not moderate the depletion
effect for UG or DG proposers.
To summarize, in Experiment 2 we replicated the results of
Experiment 1 for UG proposers, using a different manipula-
tion for ego-depletion and a different structure of the game.
Specifically, a shortage of cognitive-control resources resulted in
an increase of fair behavior. For depleted DG allocators however,
we found the reversed pattern, i.e., they demonstrated a decrease
of fair behavior compared to non-depleted allocators. Further, in
line with previous findings (Van Dijk et al., 2004), pro-social par-
ticipants tended overall to care more for fairness than pro-self
participants. Yet, participants’ SVO did not moderate the effect
of ego depletion in the UG or in the DG. It is worth noticing,
however that the number of participants within each orien-
tation (i.e., pro-self/pro-social) in each condition is relatively
small.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Is the automatic fairness tendency of UG proposers due to auto-
matically elicited fairness preferences, or is it due to an increased
fear of rejection, i.e., automatic strategic selfish preferences asso-
ciated with risk perceptions?
The observation in Experiment 2 that depleted DG alloca-
tors became more selfish compared to the non-depleted alloca-
tors indicates that participants were less concerned with fairness
when the fear of rejection was absent. The automatic selfish
behavior demonstrated by depleted DG allocators is consistent
with the findings of a recent study which demonstrated that
ego-depletion reduced the willingness to help others (DeWall
et al., 2008). This effect was mediated by decreases in guilt feel-
ings (Xu et al., 2012). Notably, if fairness preferences drive the
high proposed offers of depleted UG proposers, we should have
observed higher offers from depleted, compared to non-depleted
DG allocators as well. Given the reversed observed pattern for
depleted DG allocators, the increase in fair behavior of the
depleted UG proposers probably reflects an automatic selfish fear
of rejection.
Interestingly, the increase in fairness behavior among UG
proposersmatches the automatic behavior of UG responders doc-
umented in most studies on that matter (e.g., Cappelletti et al.,
2011; Halali et al., in press). Specifically, it corresponds with the
increase in negative reciprocity of UG responders following a
shortage of cognitive control resources (Halali et al., in press).
The results of the current study, however, suggest that this match
in behavior is probably driven by different motivations, namely,
depleted UG proposers are motivated by automatic selfish pref-
erences rather than automatic fairness preferences, that probably
motivate depleted responders in the UG.
At first glance, given the reasoning aspect assumed to be
involved in strategic thinking it sounds contradictory that strate-
gic considerations are revealed under a shortage of cognitive
control. We suggest that different types of emotions, which are
affected differently by a shortage in cognitive control, may explain
this counter intuitive result (Halali et al., in press). Specifically,
strategic considerations of UG proposers are driven by fear that
their offer will be rejected (e.g., Nelissen et al., 2011). In contrast,
fair behavior of DG allocators is suggested to be driven by guilt
(e.g., Ellingsen et al., 2010). While fear is an immediate experi-
enced emotion that is viscerally driven (Loewenstein, 1996, 2000)
and therefore is dominant under a shortage of cognitive control
resources (Wagner and Heatherton, 2013; Vohs et al., submitted),
guilt is an anticipated emotion that is likely to be reduced under
ego depletion (e.g., Xu et al., 2012). While Nelissen et al. (2011)
suggested that guilt is an additional motivation for fair behavior
of UG proposers, given the finding that UG offers are in most
cases higher than DG offers, the strategic component in the UG
(i.e., fear of rejection) is probably more dominant in this game.
The current results suggest that this fear of rejection in the UG is
even more pronounced under ego depletion.
Another possible explanation for the seemly mixed results for
UG proposers and DG allocators may be the characteristics of
the games, which may trigger different motives for being fair.
Much research has concluded that UG behavior is mainly driven
by reciprocity (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Blount, 1995; Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Bereby-Meyer andNiederle, 2005; Radke et al.,
2012)—a motive that cannot explain DG behavior, because the
receiver in the DG cannot reciprocate (reward or punish) the
allocator’s offer. This seems to suggest an alternative hypothesis:
in games of reciprocity the automatic response is to behave in
a reciprocally fair way, while in games without reciprocal inter-
action, selfishness is the automatic response. This hypothesis is
consistent with automatic fairness on both the proposer’s and
responder’s side in the UG, as well as with automatic selfishness in
the DG. Further research is needed to distinguish between these
possible explanations.
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